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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/07/2011 Accident number: 733 
Accident time: 08:55 Accident Date: 15/03/2010 
Where it occurred: AF/0105/01625, MF 
0268, Ashraf Khail 
Village, Qara Bagh 
District, Kabul 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 03/05/2010 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
steep slope 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 11/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recored Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-04 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Kabul to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the de-miner of [Demining group] DT-04. A separate investigation team 
was also assigned by MCPA for internal investigation. The accident occurred at 08:55 hours, 
15 March 2010 in Task # AF/0105/01625/MF 0268, located in Ashraf Khail village, Qara Bagh 
district of Kabul province. 
SUMMARY: 
MF # 0268 was contaminated with anti-personnel mines laid by Russian troops in 1984 in 
order to create a security built around their military position for the protection of Bagram Air 
Base. For the second time, during the armed conflicts between Taliban and Northern Alliance 
in 1997-2000, this area was re-contaminated.  
[Demining group] DT-04 started clearance operation on mentioned task on 3rd Feb 2010, 
they cleared 16250 sqm out of 34370 sqm area, they have found/destroyed 20 anti-personnel 
(PMN and PMN2) mines before accident happening.  
On 15 March 2010 at 08:55 hrs while [the Victim] was busy in excavation of a detected signal, 
suddenly the accident happened. As a result the deminer got severe injuries on his face, eyes 
and his right hand.  
According to the investigation report the terrain of the ground where the accident happened 
was steep sloping. Therefore, the deminer created staircases there to get himself stable for 
further working. He started excavation on the top of the sloping area; the position of mine 
might had been changed due to seasonal floods, so the excavation tool touched the pressure 
plate of the mine and caused it to go off. From the injuries to the face and eyes of the 
deminer, it seems that the deminer has not used his visor properly. The area was bushy and 
required MDU support which had been identified in site clearance plan, but it was not 
provided to the team on timely manner.   
CONCLUSIONS: 
Poor supervision by the command group is a contributing factor to this accident. As in a 
proved high threat area, the deminer was working carelessly without being controlled by his 
section leader. Being late in providing MDU support to the team was another contributing 
factor to this accident.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
• It is the responsibilities of respective IP’s operations department to make sure that a 
proper system of command and control exists in the field. 
• Inappropriate use of visor resulted in injuries to the eyes and face of the deminer; 
therefore, it is highly recommended that the command and control element should be 
more supported by operations department.   
• The operations department should strongly follow the site operations plan and 
provide any support required for the clearance operations on timely manner. 
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Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by MCPA is required to be 
submitted to the MACCA Operations department by no later than 7 days, effective to the 
issue date of this letter. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 926 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Eyes; severe Face; severe Hand 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that there was no “proper system of command and control” in the field and 
the Victim was working with his visor raised and this error was not corrected. The secondary 
cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators found that the 
demining group’s Operations department had failed in its responsibilities. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible than the 
internationals with overall responsibility.  
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